concerning urbanization must take these conditions into consideration. From our study of Tepoztecan living in Mexico City, we find that peasants in Mexico adapt to city life with far greater ease than do American farm families. There is little evidence of disorganization and breakdown,² of culture conflicts, or of irremediable differences between generations, many of these trends and characteristics found among these urbanized 'Tepoztecan are in direct opposition to those that occur among urbanized farm families in the United States. Family life remains strong in Mexico City. Family cohesiveness and extended family ties increase in the city, fewer cases of separation and divorce occur, no cases of abandoned mothers and children, no cases of persons living alone or of unrelated families living together. Household composition is similar to village patterns except that more extended families live together in the city. There is a general rise in the standard of living in the city, but dietary patterns do not change greatly. Religious life in the city becomes more Catholic and disciplined; however, men play a smaller religious role and contribute less money to the church in the city. The system of compadrazgo has undergone important changes, but remains strong. Although there is a greater reliance upon doctors and patent medicines to cure illness, city Tepoztecan still use village herbal cures and in cases of severe illness sometimes return to the village to be cured. Village ties remain strong, with much visiting back and forth.

In considering possible explanations for the above findings the following factors would seem to be most relevant: (1) Mexico City has been an important political, economic, and religious center for Tepoztecan since pre-Hispanic times. The contact with an urban, albeit Indian, culture was an old pattern, and has continued throughout recent history. (2) Mexico City is much more homogeneous than most large urban centers in the United States, both in terms of the predominance of Catholicism and of the cultural backgrounds of its people. Neither Mexico City nor Mexico as a whole has had much immigration from other parts of the world. The population of Mexico City therefore has very close ties with the rural hinterlands. (3) Mexico City is essentially conservative in tradition. In Mexico most of the revolutions have begun in the country. The city has been the refuge for the well-to-do rural families whose local positions were threatened. (4) Mexico City is not as highly industrialized as many American cities and does not present the same conditions of life. (5) Mexican farmers live in well-organized villages that are more like cities and towns than like the open-country settlement pattern of American farmers. (6) Finally, Tepoztlan is close to Mexico City, not only geographically but also culturally. The similarities between the value systems of working-class and lower-middle-class families in Mexico City and those of Tepoztecan are probably much greater than those between, let us say, families from the hill country of Arkansas and working- and middle-class families from St. Louis or Detroit.

In conclusion, it must be emphasized that this study is still in its preliminary stage, and the findings are therefore tentative. The primary purpose has been to indicate a research design which might yield valid and reliable data for the understanding of the urbanization process. It may be that Tepoztlan was not the best possible choice for this kind of study because of its proximity to Mexico City. It may also be that Tepoztlan is a special case from other points of view. Certainly we need other studies. We should have follow-up studies of migrants to the city from George Foster's Tarascan village of Tzintzuntzan, from Robert Redfield's and Villa Rojas' Maya village of Chan-Kom, from Julio de la Fuente's Zapotecan village of Yalalag, to determine to what extent the findings agree with those from Tepoztlan. It would also be important to have comparative studies of migrants to Mexico City, not from ancient and stable communities like Tepoztlan, but from plantation areas populated by poor and landless farm laborers.

Notes

1. I am grateful to the Graduate Research Board of the University of Illinois for financial assistance on this project. The field research in Mexico City was carried out in the summer of 1951 with the aid of a group of students from the University of Illinois.

2. The tendency to view the city as the source of all evil and to idealize rural life has been corrected somewhat by the work of rural sociologists in recent years. We are no longer certain that rural society per se is necessarily as suspicious and anxiety-free as we once thought. Studies by Magnus and his colleagues suggest that just as high an incidence of psychosomatic illness among the farm population of portions of Ohio as in urban areas (see A. R. Magnus and John R. Sleeper, Mental Health Needs in A Rural and Semiurban Area of Ohio, Mimeo, Ball, No. 1951. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. [January 1947]). Moreover, a study by Goldhammer and Marshall suggests that there has been no increase in the psychoses (and, for instance, also in the neurasthenias) over the past hundred years in the state of Massachusetts, a state that has undergone considerable industrial development during this period (see Herbert Goldhammer and Andrew W. Marshall, The Frequency of Mental Disease: Long-Term Trends and Present Status. The Rand Corp. [July 1949].)

3. Theodore Caplow's excellent article on "The Social Ecology of Guatemala City" (Social Forces, 28, 113 [December 1949]) suggests the provincialism of earlier sociological ideas about the nature of the city. Caplow writes, "The literature of urban geography and urban sociology has a tendency to project as universal those characteristics of urbanism which European and American students are most familiar with... there was until recently a tendency to ascribe to all cities characteristics which now appear to be specific to Chicago..." (p. 132). Caplow raises the question whether much of the anarchic and unstable character attributed by many authorities to urban life in general is not merely a particular aspect of the urban history of the United States and Western Europe since the Renaissance" (p. 133).


5. There is the possibility of other kinds of disorganization which might be manifested on a "deeper" level. In connection with this it will be interesting to compare the findings of the Rorschachs given to the Tepoztecan families living in the city, with the findings on the Rorschachs from the village of Tepoztlan. It should also be noted that our findings for Tepoztecan families in Mexico City do not mean that there is no "disorganization" in Mexico City as a whole. A comparison of the statistical indices on crime, delinquency, and divorce, between urban and rural populations in Mexico, shows a much higher incidence for urban areas (see José E. Inzulaga, La Estruturacao Social y Cultural de Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Economica, Mexico [1951]).

Reading 13

Workaday World, Crack Economy

Philippe Bourgois

I was forced into crack against my will. When I first moved to East Harlem—"El Barrio"—as a newlywed in the spring of 1985, I was looking for an inexpensive New York City apartment from which I could write about the experience of poverty and ethnic segregation in the heart of one of the most expensive cities in the world. I was interested in the political economy of inner-city street culture. I wanted to probe the Achilles' heel of the richest
industrialized nation in the world by documenting how it imposes racial segregation and economic marginalization on so many of its Latino/a and African-American citizens.

My original subject was the entire underground (untaxed) economy, from curbside car repairing and baby-sitting to unlicensed off-track betting and drug dealing. I had never even heard of crack when I first arrived in the neighborhood—no one knew about this particular substance yet, because this brittle compound of cocaine and baking soda processed into efficiently smokable pellets was not yet available as a mass-marketed product. By the end of the year, however, most of my friends, neighbors, and acquaintances had been swept into the multibillion-dollar crack cocaine: selling it, smoking it, fretting over it. I followed them, and I watched the murder rate in the projects opposite my crumbling tenement apartment spiral into one of the highest in Manhattan.

But this essay is not about crack, or drugs, per se. Substance abuse in the inner city is merely a symptom—and a vivid symbol—if deeper dynamics of social marginalization and alienation. Of course, on an immediately visible personal level, addiction and substance abuse are among the most immediate, brutal facts shaping daily life on the street. Most important, however, the two dozen street dealers and their families that I befriended were not interested in talking primarily about drugs. On the contrary, they wanted me to learn all about their daily struggles for subsistence and dignity at the poverty line.

Through the 1980s and 1990s, slightly more than one in three families in El Barrio have received public assistance. Female heads of these impoverished households have to supplement their meager checks in order to keep their children alive. Many are mothers who make extra money by baby-sitting their neighborhood’s children, or by housekeeping for a paying boarder. Others may bartend at one of the half-dozen social clubs and after-hours dancing spots scattered throughout the neighborhood. Some work “off the books” in their living rooms as seamstresses for garment contractors. Finally, many also find themselves obliged to establish amorous relationships with men who are willing to make cash contributions to their household expenses.

Income-generating strategies in the underground economy are more publicly visible. Some men repair cars on the curb; others wait on stools for unlicensed construction subcontractors to pick them up for fly-by-night demolition jobs or window renovation projects. Many sell “numbers”—the street’s version of off-track betting. The most visible cohorts hawk “nickels and dimes” of one illegal drug or another. They are part of the most robust, multibillion-dollar sector of the booming underground economy. Cocaine and crack, in particular during the mid-1980s and through the early 1990s, followed by heroin in the mid-1990s, have become the fastest-growing—if not the only—equal-opportunity employers of men in Harlem. Retail drug sales easily outcompete other income-generating opportunities, whether legal or illegal.

Why should these young men and women take the subway to work minimum-wage jobs—or even double-minimum-wage jobs—in downtown offices when they can usually earn more, at least in the short run, by selling drugs on the corner in front of their apartment or schoolyard? In fact, I am always surprised that so many inner-city men and women remain in the legal economy and work nine-to-five plus overtime, barely making ends meet. According to the 1990 census of East Harlem, 48 percent of all males and 33 percent of females over 16 were employed in officially reported jobs, compared with a citywide average of 64 percent for men and 49 percent for women. In the census tracts surrounding my apartment, 53 percent of all men over 16 years of age (1,923 out of 3,647) and 28 percent of all women over 16 (1,307 out of 4,626) were working legally in officially censused jobs. An additional 17 percent of the civilian labor force was unemployed but actively looking for work, compared with 16 percent for El Barrio as a whole, and 9 percent for all of New York City.

“IF I WAS WORKING LEGAL . . .”

Street dealers tend to brag to outsiders and to themselves about how much money they make each night. In fact, their income is almost never as consistently high as they report it to be. Most street sellers, like my friend Primo (who, along with other friends and co-workers, allowed me to tape hundreds of hours of conversation with him over five years), are paid on a piece-rate commission basis. When converted into an hourly wage, this is often a relatively paltry sum. According to my calculations, the workers in the Game Room crackhouse, for example, averaged slightly less than double the legal minimum wage—between 7 and 8 dollars an hour. There were plenty of exceptional nights, however, when they made up to ten times minimum wage—and these are the nights they remember when they reminisce. They forget about all the other shifts when they were unable to work because of police raids, and they certainly do not count as forfeited working hours the nights they spent in jail.

This was brought home to me symbolically one night as Primo and his co-worker Caesar were shutting down the Game Room. Caesar unscrewed the fuses in the electrical box to disconnect the video games. Primo had finished stacking the leftover bundles of crack vials inside a hollowed-out live electrical socket and was counting the night’s thick wad of receipts. I was struck by how thin the handful of bills was that he separated out and folded neatly into his personal billfold. Primo and Caesar then eagerly lowered the iron riot gates over the Game Room’s windows and snapped shut the heavy Yale padlocks. They were moving with the smooth, hurried gestures of workers preparing to go home after an honest day’s hard labor. Marveling at the universality in the body language of workers rushing at closing time, I felt an urge to compare the wages paid by this alternative economy. I grabbed Primo’s wallet out of his back pocket, carefully giving a wide berth to the fatty wad in his front pocket that represented Ray’s share of the night’s income—and that could cost Primo his life if it were waylaid. Unexpectedly, I pulled out fifteen dollars’ worth of food stamps along with two $20 bills. After an embarrassed giggle, Primo stammered that his mother had added him to her food-stamp allotment.

Primo: I gave my girl, Maria, half of it. I said, “Here, take it, use it if you need it for whatever.” And then the other half I still got it in my wallet for emergencies.

Like that, we always got a couple of dollars here and there, to survive with. Because tonight, straight cash, I only got garbage. Forty dollars. Do you believe that?

At the same time that wages can be relatively low in the crack economy, working conditions are often inferior to those in the legal economy. Aside from the obvious dangers of being shot, or of going to prison, the physical work space of most crackhouses is usually unpleasant. The infrastructure of the Game Room, for example, was much worse
than that of any legal retail outfit in East Harlem: There was no bathroom, no running water, no telephone, no heat in the winter, and no air conditioning in the summer. Primo occasionally complained:

**Primo:** Everything you see here [sweeping his arm at the scratched and dented video games, the walls with peeling paint, the floor slippery with litter, the filthy windows pasted over with ripped movie posters] is fucked up. It sucks, man [pointing at the red 40-watt bare bulb hanging from an exposed fixture in the middle of the room and exuding a sick twilight].

Indeed, the only furnishings besides the video games were a few grimy milk crates and bent aluminum stools. Worse yet, a smell of urine and vomit usually permeated the locale. For a few months Primo was able to maintain a rudimentary sound system, but it was eventually beaten to a pulp during one of Caesar’s drunken rages. Of course, the deficient infrastructure was only one part of the depressing working conditions.

**Primo:** Plus I don’t like to see people fucking up [handing over three vials to a nervously pacing customer]. This is fucked-up shit. I don’t like this crack dealing. Word up.

[Gunshots in the distance] Hear that?

In private, especially in the last few years of my residence, Primo admitted that he wanted to go back to the legal economy.

**Primo:** I just fuck up the money here. I rather be legal.

**Philippe:** But you wouldn’t be the head man on the block with so many girlfriends.

**Primo:** I might have women on my dick right now, but I would be much cooler if I was working legal. I wouldn’t be drinking and the coke wouldn’t be there every night.

Plus if I was working legally I would have women on my dick too, because I would have money.

**Philippe:** But you make more money here than you could ever make working legit.

**Primo:** O.K. So you want the money but you really don’t want to do the job.

I really hate it, man. Hate it. I hate the people. I hate the environment. I hate the whole shit, man. But it’s like you get caught up with it. You do it, and you say, “Ay, fuck it today.” Another day, another dollar [pointing at an emaciated customer who was just entering].

But I don’t really, really think that I would have hoped that I can say I’m gonna be richer one day. I can’t say that. I think about it, but I’m just living day to day.

If I was working legal, I wouldn’t be hanging out so much. I wouldn’t be treating you [pointing to the 16-ounce can of Colt 45 in my hand].

In a job, you know, my environment would change ... totally. ‘Cause I’d have different friends. Right after work I’d go out with a co-worker, for lunch, for dinner. After work I may go home; I’m too tired for hanging out—I know I gotta work tomorrow.

After working a legal job, I’m pretty sure I’d be good.

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**BURNED IN THE FIRE ECONOMY**

The problem is that Primo’s good intentions do not lead anywhere when the only legal jobs he can compete for fail to provide him with a livable wage. None of the crack dealers were explicitly conscious of the links between their limited options in the legal economy, their addiction to drugs and their dependence on the crack economy for economic survival and personal dignity. Nevertheless, all of Primo’s colleagues and employees told stories of rejecting what they considered to be intolerable working conditions at entry-level jobs...

Most entered the legal labor market at exceptionally young ages. By the time they were 12, they were bagging and delivering groceries at the supermarket for tips, stocking beer off the books in local bodegas, or running errands. Before reaching 21, however, virtually none had fulfilled their early childhood dreams of finding stable, well-paid legal work.

The problem is structural: From the 1950s through the 1990s second-generation inner-city Puerto Ricans were trapped in the most vulnerable niche of a factory-based economy that was rapidly being replaced by service industries. Between 1950 and 1990, the proportion of factory jobs in New York City decreased approximately threefold at the same time that service-sector jobs doubled. The Department of City Planning calculates that more than 800,000 industrial jobs were lost from the 1960s through the early 1990s, while the total number of jobs of all categories remained more or less constant at 3.5 million.

Few scholars have noted the cultural dislocations of the new service economy. These cultural clashes have been most pronounced in the office-work service jobs that have multiplied because of the dramatic expansion of the finance, real estate, and insurance (FIRE) sector in New York City. Service work in professional offices is the most dynamic place for ambitious inner-city youth to find entry-level jobs if they aspire to upward mobility. Employment as mailroom clerks, photocopiers, and messengers in the highrise office corridors of the financial district propels many into a working-class cultural confrontation with the upper-middle-class white world. Obedience to the norms of highrise, office-corridor culture is in direct contradiction to street culture’s definitions of personal dignity—especially for males who are socialized not to accept public subordination.

Most of the dealers have not completely withdrawn from the legal economy. On the contrary—they are precariously perched on its edge. Their poverty remains their only constant as they alternate between street-level crack dealing and just-above-minimum-wage legal employment. The working-class jobs they manage to find are objectively recognized to be among the least desirable in U.S. society; hence the following list of just a few of the jobs held by some of the Game Room regulars during the years I knew them: unlicensed asbestos remover, home attendant, streetcorner fier distributor, deep-fried fry cook, and night-shift security guard on the violent ward at the municipal hospital for the criminally insane.

The stable factory-worker incomes that might have allowed Caesar and Primo to support families have largely disappeared from the inner city. Perhaps if their social network had not been confined to the weakest sector of manufacturing in a period of rapid job loss, their teenage working-class dreams might have stabilized them for long enough to enable them to adapt to the restructuring of the local economy. Instead, they find...
themselves propelled headlong into an explosive confrontation between their sense of cultural dignity versus the humiliating interpersonal subordination of service work.

Workers like Caesar and Primo appear inarticulate to their professional supervisors when they try to imitate the language of power in the workplace; they stumble pathetically over the enunciation of unfamiliar words. They cannot decipher the hastily scribbled instructions—rife with mysterious abbreviations—that are left for them by harried office managers on diminutive Post-its. The "common sense" of white-collar work is foreign to them; they do not, for example, understand the logic in filing triplicate copies of memos or for posting invoices. When they attempt to improvise or show initiative, they fail miserably and instead appear inefficient—or even hostile—for failing to follow "clearly specified" instructions.

In the highrise office buildings of midtown Manhattan or Wall Street, newly employed inner-city high school dropouts suddenly realize they look like idiotic buffoons to the men and women for whom they work. But people like Primo and Caesar have not passively accepted their structural victimization. On the contrary, by embroiling themselves in the underground economy and proudly embracing street culture, they are seeking an alternative to their social marginalization. In the process, on a daily level, they become the actual agents administering their own destruction and their community's suffering.

Both Primo and Caesar experienced deep humiliation and insecurity in their attempts to penetrate the foreign, hostile world of highrise office corridors. Primo had bitter memories of being the mailroom clerk and errand boy at a now-defunct professional trade magazine. The only time he explicitly admitted to having experienced racism was when he described how he was treated at that particular work setting.

**Primo:** I had a prejudiced boss. . . . When she was talking to people she would say, "He's illiterate," as if I was really that stupid that I couldn't understand what she was talking about.

So what I did one day—you see they had this big dictionary right there on the desk, a big heavy motherfucker—so what I just did was open up the dictionary, and I just looked up the word *illiterate*. And that's when I saw what she was calling me.

So she's saying that I'm stupid or something. I'm stupid [pointing to himself with both thumbs and making a bulking face]. "He doesn't know shit."

In contrast, in the underground economy Primo never had to risk this kind of threat to his self-worth.

**Primo:** Ray would never disrespect me that way; he wouldn't tell me that because he's illiterate too, plus I've got more education than him. I almost got a G.E.D.

The contemporary street sensitivity to being disdained immediately emerges in these memories of office humiliation. The machismo of street culture exacerbates the sense of insult experienced by men because the majority of office supervisors at the entry level are women. In the lowest recesses of New York City's FIRE sector, tens of thousands of messengers, photocopy machine operators, and security guards serving the Fortune 500 companies are brusquely ordered about by young white executives—often female—who sometimes make bimonthly salaries superior to the underlings' yearly wages. The extraordinary wealth of Manhattan's financial district exacerbates the sense of sexist-racist insult associated with performing just-above-minimum-wage labor.

"I DON'T EVEN GOT A DRESS SHIRT"

Several months earlier, I had watched Primo drop out of a "motivational training" employment program in the basement of his mother's housing project, run by former heroin addicts who had just received a multimillion-dollar private sector grant for their innovative approach to training the "unemployable." Primo felt profoundly disrespected by the program, and he focused his discontent on the humiliation he felt because of his inappropriate wardrobe. The fundamental philosophy of such motivational job-training programs is that "these people have an attitude problem." They take a boot-camp approach to their unemployed clients, ripping their self-esteem apart during the first week in order to build them back up with an epiphanic realization that they want to find jobs as security guards, messengers, and data-input clerks in just-above-minimum-wage service-sector positions. The program's highest success rate had been with middle-aged African-American women who wanted to terminate their relationship to welfare once their children left home.

I originally had a "bad attitude" toward the premise of psychologically motivating and manipulating people to accept boring, poorly paid jobs. At the same time, however, the violence and self-destruction I was witnessing at the Game Room was convincing me that it is better to be exploited at work than to be outside the legal labor market. In any case, I persuaded Primo and a half-dozen of his Game Room associates to sign up for the program. Even Caesar was tempted to join.

None of the crack dealers lasted for more than three sessions. Primo was the first to drop out, after the first day. For several weeks he avoided talking about the experience. I repeatedly pressed him to explain why he "just didn't show up" at the sessions. Only after repeated badgering on my part did he finally express the deep sense of shame and vulnerability he experienced whenever he was attempted to venture into the legal labor market.

**Philippe:** Yo Primo, listen to me. I worry that there's something taking place that you're not aware of, in terms of yourself. Like the coke that you be sniffling all the time; it's like every night.

**Primo:** What do you mean?

**Philippe:** Like not showing up at the job training. You say it's just procrastination, but I'm scared that it's something deeper that you're not dealing with.

**Primo:** The truth though—listen Felipe—my biggest worry was the dress code, 'cause my gear is limited. I don't even got a dress shirt, I only got one pair of shoes, and you can't wear sneakers at that program. They wear ties too—don't they? Well, I ain't even got ties—I only got the one you lent me.
I would’ve been there three weeks in the same gear: T-shirt and jeans. Estoy jodido como un boi. [I’m all fucked up like a bum.]

**Philippe:** What the fuck kinda bullshit excuse are you talking about? Don’t tell me you were thinking that shit. No one notices how people are dressed.

**Primo:** Yo, Felipe, this is for real. Listen to me. I was thinking about that shit hard. Hell yah.

Hell, yes, they would notice if somebody’s wearing a fucked-up tie and shirt. I don’t want to be in a program all abocharrado [bumlike]. I probably won’t even concentrate, getting dished, like... and being looked at like a sucker. Dirty jeans... or like old jeans, because I would have to wear jeans, ’cause I only got one slack. Word though. I only got two dress shirts and one of them is missing buttons.

I didn’t want to tell you about that because it’s like a poor excuse, but that was the only shit I was really thinking about. At the time I just said, “Well, I just don’t show up.”

And Felipe, I’m a stupid [very] skinny nigga’. So I have to be careful how I dress, otherwise people will think I be on the stem [a crack addict who smokes out of a glass-stem pipe].

**Philippe:** [nervously] Oh shit. I’m even skinnier than you. People must think I’m a total drug addict.

**Primo:** Don’t worry. You’re white.

# READING 14

**Street Baptism: Chicano Gang Initiation**

**James Diego Vigil**

Street gangs in Chicano barrios (neighborhoods) have regularized a gang initiation ordeal which serves several functions. While long and deep exposure to street socialization has made many youths at risk to become gang members, this “street baptism” of gang initiation has become a clear marker and accelerator of gang behavior. For the gang, the baptism functions as a ritual ceremony to show admittance and dedication to the gang. For the initiate, the baptism is an introduction to the gang and “sanctifies” him (or less often, her) as a true member. This event represents different facets of the gang subculture, such as group membership, social solidarity, ritualistic behavior, ceremonial processes, gender clarification, and symbolic changes.

Data and information for this analysis have been gathered over several years, from 1978 to 1982 and again from 1989 to the present (Vigil 1989a, 1989b, 1993a, 1993b, 1994), in a continuing ethnographic investigation of more than two dozen different barrios of Mexican Americans in the greater Los Angeles area. Old and more recently established gangs in urban and suburban neighborhoods were examined. In all, more than sixty life histories and three hundred questionnaire-guided interviews were gathered along with many pages of ethnographic observation notes. Although female gang members were included in the study, the emphasis usually (as here) was on males. The focus was the cbulo (marginalized) gang youth, from 12 to 19 years of age, who belonged to and identified with the barrio street gang. These gangs have been fixtures in some communities for over 40 years (Vigil 1989a) and recently have spiraled out of control with gang violence—drive-by shootings, random shootings, school ground fights, and so on—daily capturing the attention of the media and law enforcement.

Most of the older Southern California barrios, both urban and (originally) rural, came into being as visibly distinct, spatially bounded neighborhoods separated from other neighborhoods, located, e.g., “across the tracks,” in a government-owned housing development or in ravines, hollows, etc.—what Bogardus (1926) called the area’s interstices. Families of unskilled and semi-skilled workers settled into the small houses or apartments, which were often located near major worksites—railroad yards, brickyards, or concentrations of small factories. Socioeconomic and cultural barriers reinforced the physical boundaries. Later, most of the rural enclaves were incorporated into the suburbs that grew up around them, but they remained visibly distinct from the surrounding tract home neighborhoods. Newer urban and suburban barrios arose in once prosperous, but now rundown, neighborhoods as the Mexican American population continued to grow. In these, as in the older barrios, relatively low skill levels of the workforce led to recurrent joblessness and poverty for many households.

For example, the White Fence barrio is located across a river and freeway from downtown Los Angeles. It was first settled in the 1920s by Mexicans who worked nearby and built their homes in the ravines alongside an affluent Anglo neighborhood. Centered on its small Catholic church, the community remains one of the poorest in the county and still features empty lots on many blocks. On the other hand, the Cucamonga barrio began, also in the 1920s, as a Mexican farm laborers’ settlement. It was located in a vineyard and close to the citrus groves near the boundary between San Bernardino and Los Angeles counties. By the 1970s, it was surrounded by middle-class housing tracts, but still had many unpaved roads and no sewers (Moore and Vigil 1993). While these barrios have distinctive differences, they and most others in the region share a history of sociocultural marginality, poverty, crowded living conditions, and institutional neglect (Vigil 1989a).

An age-graded cohorting tradition in each barrio ensures a fairly steady, if small (usually no more than 10%), supply of youths (often the brothers, nephews, cousins, and sons of older members) to carry on the gang reputation for fighting and defending its “turf.” Even though the adolescent group that constitutes the gang participates in normal youthful activities such as socializing, playing sports, and driving cars, it is the more destructive habits that reflect the troubled and deeply disturbed lives of its members. Poverty, stressed families, insensitive schools, intergenerational strife, and culture conflict are among the prerequisites to the creation of gangs and gang members (e.g., Covey et al. 1992). Moore (1991), for example, found that more than a third of the gang members in her systematic sampling of